Raising the war on political correctness to a new and higher intellectual level, Philip Devine sheds fresh light on the whole question of cultural standards and the fashionable notion of multiculturalism. While acknowledging the diversity of ways of life and the differing belief systems that arise from and justify those ways of life, the author attacks the current exploitation of diversity to justify a militantly intolerant relativism. His wide-ranging and erudite work connects cultural issues to our real-world existence (...) as biological and historical beings, pulling together ideas of bioethics, education, and the structure and purpose of families. This work will be of interest to those fighting the culture wars across the humanities and social and behavioral sciences. (shrink)

Until recently, torture was regarded as an unthinkable act. But in the dark years following September 11, 2001, many people have defended it openly as they have many other kinds of action previously considered taboo. And the underlying issues are complicated. Yet at least a virtually absolute prohibition on interrogational torture can be rationally defended.

One of the deepest problems in philosophical theology is that of divine causality and human freedom. The analogy between God and the author of a work of fiction can shed light on this and many other thorny problems in philosophical and dogmatic theology.

The denial of moral absolutes rests, I think, on a seductive but fallacious argument, which I shall attempt both to expound and to refute here. Human beings are highly complex creatures living in a highly complex world. Every human being is different from every other, every interaction or relationship between or among human beings is unique. Hence also every occasion for moral choice is also unique, and all those action kinds - be theyadultery, murder, rape, theft, ortorture on which moralists (...) are accustomed to pass judgment include an enormous variety of differing transactions, which ideally ought to be evaluated one by one. Moreover, each proposed action has a variety of different aspects: intention, foreseen consequence, conventional meaning, and symbolic significance for example, which bear on moral choice in a wide variety of ways. Moral rules are therefore rules of thumb, open to exceptions whenever persuasive arguments for making them are provided. (shrink)

It is commonplace that negative duties are more stringent than positive duties. it is also commonplace that this distinction requires defense, in particular against those who regard it as a mere apology for the privileges of the wealthy and secure. i conclude, though real, the distinction between negative and positive duties is not as deep as some philosophers have supposed--that it makes best sense in terms of a deeper distinction between the intended and the foreseen consequences of our actions.

I here criticize the use of science-fiction examples in ethics, chiefly, though not solely, by defenders of abortion. We have no reliable intuitions concerning such examples—certainly nothing strong enough to set against the strong intuition that infanticide is virtually always wrong.

I defend the coherence of Theistic Evolutionism, though I do not present any direct argument for either theism or (broadly Darwinian) evolution. I distinguish between evolution as a scientific theory, however well established, and evolutionism as a religion or ideology. I argue that the confusion between the two senses of evolutionism is bad for both biology and religion, and conclude by suggesting that, in Irving Kristol's words, 'our goal should be to have biology and evolution taught in a way that (...) points to what we don't know as well as what we know'. (shrink)

I here discuss an argument frequently dismissed as a fallacy – the slippery slope or camel's nose. The argument has three forms – analogical, argumentative, and prudential. None of these provides a deductive guarantee, but all can provide considerations capable of influencing the intellect. Our evaluation of such arguments reflects our background social and evaluative assumptions.

Presents a contemporary version of the natural law tradition as a valid approach to ethical problems.

Austin's book raises, but does not resolve, a problem for the analysis of belief as a two-termed relation between a believer and a proposition. The argument turns to account a puzzle about beliefs expressed in terms of the demonstratives this and that--and hence also I, here, and now--to expose a threatened inconsistency in the doctrine of propositions most commonly held among analytic philosophers.

This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of St. Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God.

I discuss the religious implications of accepting the ontological argument as sound. in particular, i attempt to show in detail how the argument fails to validate religious belief.

Many of us want to say that there is an absolute—or at least a virtually absolute—prohibition on torturing people. But we live in a world in which firm moral restraints of all sorts are hard to defend. Neither contemporary conventional morality, nor any of the available moral theories, provides adequate support for the deliverances of the “wisdom of repugnance” in this area. Nor do they support casuistry capable of distinguishing torture from (sometimes legitimate) forms of rough treatment. I here make (...) some suggestions concerningthe improvement of this situation. (shrink)

Caroline Franks Davis here undertakes an assessment of the value of religious experiences as evidence for religious beliefs. She distinguishes this question from that of the veridical character of particular experiences or their value for the person undergoing them or his community. She attends both to the phenomenological variety of religious experiences and the variety of cultural settings in which they take place. She concludes that religious experience can form an important part of the case for what she calls "broad (...) theism"--the belief that there is a "true self" behind the phenomenal ego and that the highest good for a human being is union or harmonious relation with this holy and eternal ultimate reality. Broad theism, she argues, can explain the two most persuasive forms of religious experience--the numinous and the mystical--though it is not enough to ground a living religion. (shrink)

The newest addition to the Point/Counterpoint Series, Abortion: Three Perspectives features a debate between four noted philosophers - Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, Philip E. Devine, and Alison M. Jaggar - presenting different perspectives on one of the most socially and politically argued issues of the past 30 years. The three main arguments include the "liberal" pro-choice approach, the "communitarian" pro-life approach, and the "gender justice" approach. Divided into two parts, the text features the authors' ideas, developed in (...) depth, and their responses to one another within each framework. As philosophers, the authors have special skills in critical analysis and thinking systematically about values. The text is appropriate for advanced courses in ethics, bioethics, sex and gender issues, and contemporary moral issues. (shrink)

This book presents a defense of the reality of God in the sense in which Nietzsche proclaimed His death. It explores various contemporary versions of Nietzsche's maxim God is dead and proposes an alternative to them. Philip E.Devine critically examines three views that, in one way or another, accept the death of God and take it as central to the intellectual life: pragmatism, which asserts that the only end of the intellectual life is the pursuit of worldly goods (...) other than truth; relativism', which admits a multiplicity of truths corresponding to the modes of life pursued by human beings; and nihilism, to which the pursuit of truth is a deception. Devine then defends his own position on the nature of God and religion and argues for a convergence between the concerns of faith and philosophy. (shrink)

If someone abstains from meat-eating for reasons of taste or personal economics, no moral or philosophical question arises. But when a vegetarian attempts to persuade others that they, too, should adopt his diet, then what he says requires philosophical attention. While a vegetarian might argue in any number of ways, this essay will be concerned only with the argument for a vegetarian diet resting on a moral objection to the rearing and killing of animals for the human table. The vegetarian, (...) in this laense, does not merely require us to change or justify our eating habits, but to reconsider our attitudes and behaviour towards members of other species across a wide range of practices. (shrink)